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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Christopher Lee Martin appealed from the district court’s Order Denying Rule 35 
Motion.  On appeal, Mr. Martin asserted the district court erred when it denied his Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion to correct the computation of credit for time served, 
because he is entitled to credit for all the time served. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court did not err when it 
denied the Rule 35 motion to correct the computation of credit for time served, because 
Mr. Martin was not entitled to credit towards his burglary sentence for time served on a 
separate offense.  (Resp. Br., pp.7-11.) 
 This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s argument.  This Reply Brief 
is also necessary to address the Idaho Court of Appeals’ recent decision in State v. 
Brand, No. 43441, 2016 Opinion No. 20 (Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016), where the Court 
affirmed the district court’s denial of a similar motion for credit for time served.  
Mr. Martin asserts the State’s argument in the Respondent’s Brief and the Court of 
Appeals’ holding in Brand are both undermined by the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision 
in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015). 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Martin’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Martin’s Rule 35 motion to correct the 
computation of credit for time served, because he is entitled to credit for all the 
time served? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Martin’s Rule 35 Motion To Correct The 
Computation Of Credit For Time Served, Because He Is Entitled To Credit For All The 
Time Served  
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Mr. Martin asserts the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35 motion to 
correct the computation of credit for time served, because he is entitled to credit for all 
the time served.  Based on the service of the warrants here, Mr. Martin served a total of 
2,204 days prejudgment time in this case.  (See R., pp.107, 109.)   The district court 
only gave Mr. Martin credit for a total of 170 days.  (See R., pp.126-27.)  However, 
under the plain language of I.C. § 18-309, Mr. Martin is entitled to credit for all the time 
served in this case.  Thus, the district court erred when it denied his Rule 35 motion to 
correct the computation of credit for time served. 
 
B. Under The Plain Language Of I.C. § 18-309, Mr. Martin Is Entitled To Credit For 
All The Time Served 
 
Mr. Martin asserts that, under the plain language of I.C. § 18-309, he is entitled to 
credit for the time served in this case.  The statue does not restrict credit for time served 
to situations where the incarceration was only for the offense for which the judgment 
was entered. 
Section 18-309 provides “the person against whom the judgment was entered 
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to entry of 
judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which the 
judgment was entered.”  I.C. § 18-309(1).  As the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in 
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015), the plain language of Section 18-309 grants 
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defendants credit for prejudgment time served on each offense, even if the prejudgment 
time served was a consequence of multiple offenses.  See Owens, 158 Idaho at 4-6.  
Thus, Mr. Martin is entitled to credit for time served following service of the warrants for 
the offense in the instant case, even though the periods of prejudgment incarceration 
were a consequence of multiple offenses (namely, the instant offense and the other 
case/parole violation).  See I.C. § 18-309(1).  Once the warrants were served on 
Mr. Martin, he was incarcerated “for the offense” in this case.  See id. 
The State argues that “under the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-309(1) 
[Mr.] Martin was not entitled to [the] credit he sought.”  (Resp. Br., p.8.)  The State 
contends the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decisions in State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67 
(Ct. App. 2005), and State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849 (Ct. App. 1993), control the outcome 
here, and that Mr. Martin “is not entitled to credit towards his burglary sentence for time 
he spent incarcerated on the arson conviction and subsequent parole violation.”  (Resp. 
Br., p.10.)  The State argues “Owens supports the ultimate conclusions of Vasquez and 
Horn because Owens specifically interpreted Idaho Code § 18-309 as providing for 
credit only if the defendant’s prejudgment jail time was for the offense the defendant 
was convicted of and sentenced for.  This was the same holding in Horn and Vasquez 
and is supported by the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-309.”  (Resp. Br., p.11 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) 
Similarly, the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Brand, No. 43441, 2016 Opinion 
No. 20 (Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016), recently held a district court did not err in denying a 
defendant’s motion for credit for time served “because his incarceration was not for the 
grand theft offense for which judgment was entered.”  Brand, 2016 Opinion No. 20, slip 
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op. at 4.1  The defendant in Brand was incarcerated in jail on drug possession charges 
when he was served with an arrest warrant in a grand theft case.  Id. at 1-2.  The 
defendant remained in jail until he was sentenced in the grand theft case.  Id. at 2.  The 
district court denied the defendant’s motion for credit for time served from when he was 
served the arrest warrant to when the judgment of conviction was entered in the grand 
theft case.  Id.  
On appeal, the Brand defendant asserted the district court erred in denying his 
motion for credit for time served, because he was incarcerated for grand theft from the 
date he was served the arrest warrant to the date the judgment of conviction was 
entered.  See id.  The defendant asserted the plain language of I.C. § 18-309 and the 
Owens decision supported his argument.  Id. at 3.  However, the Court of Appeals 
determined “[t]he same limit articulated by this Court—that incarceration must be a 
consequence of or attributable to the offense or conduct for which the sentence is 
imposed—applied in Owens because the incarceration was a consequence of the eight 
offenses he was convicted of and sentenced for.”  Id. at 4; see id. at 3 (citing Vasquez, 
142 Idaho at 68; Horn, 124 Idaho at 850). 
The Brand Court then determined the defendant was not incarcerated for grand 
theft during the relevant period, but rather was incarcerated for the drug possession 
charges.  Id. at 4.  The Court concluded that if the defendant had not been awaiting 
sentencing for grand theft, he would have been serving his drug possession sentences 
in prison.  Id.  According to the Brand Court, the defendant “happened to be served the 
arrest warrant for his grand theft offense while he was already incarcerated for drug 
                                            
1 As of the current date, the Brand decision is not yet final. 
 6 
possession.  As a result, the incarceration could not be attributable to the grand theft 
charge, and the grand theft charge had no effect upon [the defendant’s] liberty.”  Id.  
Thus, the Court held the district court did not err in denying the motion for credit for time 
served, and affirmed the district court’s decision.  Id. 
Just as the Idaho Supreme Court’s Owens decision casts doubt on the Court of 
Appeals’ causation test from Vasquez and Horn, Owens undermines the State’s 
argument in the Respondent’s Brief and the Court of Appeals’ holding in Brand.2  The 
State’s argument here (see Resp Br., pp.8-9) and the holding in Brand, see 2016 
Opinion No. 20, slip op. at 3-4, both rely upon the Court of Appeals’ causation test.  
Thus, the State’s argument and the Brand holding also read additional language into 
Section 18-309.  The State contends, and the Court of Appeals has determined, that a 
defendant would get credit for prejudgment time served if the incarceration was only for 
the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.  But the plain 
language of Section 18-309 does not contain a restriction that the prejudgment 
incarceration must be only for the instant offense.  As recognized in Owens, the statute 
instead provides for credit for prejudgment time served on each of several separate 
offenses.  See Owens, 158 Idaho at 4.  The plain language of Section 18-309 grants 
defendants credit for prejudgment time served on each offense, even if the prejudgment 
time served was a consequence of multiple offenses.   
                                            
2 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it “expect[s] lower courts, including the Court 
of Appeals, to follow decisions of this Court when there is a conflict between our 
decisions on an issue of law and those of the Court of Appeals.”  State v. Clinton, 155 
Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013). 
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Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Brand made a further addition to the plain 
language of Section 18-309.  The Brand Court articulated the causation test as requiring 
“that incarceration must be a consequence of or attributable to the offense or conduct 
for which the sentence is imposed.”  Brand, 2016 Opinion No. 20, slip op. at 4 
(emphasis added).  But the Idaho Supreme Court in Owens explained “[t]he statute 
continues to provide that a defendant gets the credit only on a requirement that 
incarceration was for ‘the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was 
entered.’”  Owens, 158 Idaho at 4 (citing I.C. § 18-309).  The word “conduct” does not 
appear in Section 18-309.  See I.C. § 18-309.  The Owens Court also emphasized the 
legislature had not “delineated credit for ‘each case’ or another description other than 
‘the offense.’”  See Owens, 158 Idaho at 4.  Thus, by tying credit for time served to 
“conduct” instead of just “the offense,” the Court of Appeals in Brand has read additional 
language into Section 18-309.  The courts do not have such authority to revise 
unambiguous statutory language.  See, e.g., Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011).  Further, if credit for time served were based on conduct, a 
court could conceivably not give credit for time served on each of multiple offenses in 
cases where the underlying conduct for the respective offenses was different, contrary 
to Owens. 
The Brand decision additionally relies upon the proposition that the grand theft 
charge in that case had no effect on the defendant’s liberty.  Brand, 2016 Opinion No. 
20, slip op. at 4.  However, Owens militates against that basis for the Court of Appeals’ 
causation test.  The defendant in Owens was sentenced for eight counts of issuing a 
check without funds.  Owens, 158 Idaho at 4.  Each individual count in Owens 
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presumably would have had no effect on the defendant’s liberty, considering that if one 
of the eight counts had been dismissed, the defendant would have been subject to 
confinement for the other counts.  But under the plain language of Section 18-309, the 
defendant was still entitled to credit for time served on each of the offenses.  See id. at 
4-6.  Likewise, in the instant case, if the charge or parole violation in the other case had 
been dismissed, Mr. Martin would still have been subject to confinement on the arrest 
warrants served in this case.  Thus, Mr. Martin would still be entitled to credit for the 
prejudgment time served. 
The Court of Appeals’ causation test has read language into Section 18-309 
providing that a defendant would get credit for prejudgment time served if the 
incarceration was only for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment 
was entered.  But Section 18-309 grants defendants credit for prejudgment time served 
on each offense, even if the prejudgment time served was a consequence of multiple 
offenses.  The Owens decision and its emphasis on the plain language of Section 18-
309 undermines the State’s argument in the Respondent’s Brief and the Court of 
Appeals’ holding in Brand.   
Under the plain language of Section 18-309, Mr. Martin should have received the 
credit he requested for all the time served.  Mr. Martin is entitled to credit for time served 
following service of the warrants for the offense in the instant case, a total of 2,204 
days.  Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Martin’s Rule 35 motion to 
correct the computation of credit for time served. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Martin respectfully requests this Court reverse the order denying his Rule 35 motion 
and remand the case for the district court to correct the computation of credit for time 
served and give Mr. Martin credit for a total of 2,204 days served. 
 DATED this 16th day of March, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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